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BAEHR v. LEWIN: HAWAII TAKES A 
TENTATIVE STEP TO LEGALIZE 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Marty K. Courson* 
"From Hawaii, best known for surfing, suntan-
ning, and hula dancing, comes news that could be 
the Pearl Harbor of social issues in the 1990s -
gay marriage."1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Baehr v. Lewin,2 the Supreme Court of Hawaii sparked a 
controversy that has potential nationwide implications. The 
court held that three same-sex couples were entitled to an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine if the State can demonstrate that 
denying the couples the right to marry under the Hawaii Mar-
riage Law3 furthers compelling state interests.4 If the State fails 
its burden, it can no longer refuse marriage licenses to couples 
merely on the basis that they are of the same sex. II Should this 
occur, gay marriages will become legal in Hawaii.6 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. Many thanks to Rebecca 
Weisman, Helen Silva, and Professor Roberta Simon of the Women's Law Forum for 
invaluable comments and direction while writing this article. Also, special thanks to my 
mentor, Professor Michael Zamperini, for his support, patience, and critical reviews. Fi-
nally, I would like to thank my best friend and partner, "J.B." Brainerd, for his love and 
never ending faith through law review, law school, and life. 
1. James P. Pinkerton, A Conservative Argument for Gay Marriage, Forming Fami-
lies Leads to Social Stability. Why Fight It?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at B7. 
2. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), motion for reconsideration or clarifica-
tion granted in part, 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993). 
3. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1992) (hereinafter the "Hawaii Marriage Law"). 
4. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
5. [d. at 57. 
6. This presupposes that the political arena has not somehow defeated same-sex 
marriage in the meantime. With the prospect of these legalized couplings engendering 
considerable public controversy, polls have shown about 60 percent opposition to same-
sex marriage. Robert Stouffer, Another View of Same-Gender Marriage, ISLAND LIFE-




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
42 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:41 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In May of 1991, the plaintiffs? filed a complaint for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of the First Cir-
cuit, State of Hawaii, seeking: (1) a declaration that the Hawaii 
Marriage Law was unconstitutional insofar as it was construed 
and applied by the Department of Health (hereinafter "DOH")8 
in refusing to issue a marriage license on the sole basis that an 
applicant couple was of the same sex; and (2) preliminary and 
permanent injunctions prohibiting the future withholding of 
marriage licenses on that sole basis.9 
The plaintiffs alleged that the DOH's interpretation and ap-
plication of the Hawaii Marriage Law to deny same-sex couples 
access to marriage licenses violated the plaintiffs' rights to pri-
vacy, equal protection, and due process of law, all of which were 
guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution.10 
In July of 1991, the DOH filed a Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings and requested that the court dismiss the com-
overturned by a State constitutional amendment. To that end, multiple bills have been 
introduced in the Hawaii Legislature that would amend the Hawaii Constitution to elim-
inate the possibility of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., H.B. 3709, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Haw. 1974) (proposing a constitutional amendment clarifying same-sex marriage as not 
constitutionally protected and defining marriage as a legal relationship solely between a 
male and a female). 
However, another bill attempts to offer a constitutional compromise by establishing 
state-wide domestic partnership registration. See H.B. 3647, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 
1974). Under this arrangement couples, who do not qualify for marriage licenses or oth-
erwise wish not to marry, would get formal recognition by the State and enjoy the same 
rights, benefits, responsibilities, and status of married people. Id. Coupled with a consti-
tutional amendment that would outlaw same-sex marriage, this domestic-partnership ar-
rangement is designed to placate both sides of the controversy. 
7. The plaintiffs were three same-sex couples whose applications for marriage li-
censes were denied. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49. 
8. The DOH is the state authority that administers marriage licenses. HAW. REv. 
STAT. §§ 572-5 to 72-6 (1992). Defendant John C. Lewin was sued in his official capacity 
as its director. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44. Throughout this note, the DOH and Lewin will 
both be referred to as the "DOH." 
9. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49. 
10. Id. at 50; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1978) ("The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. 
The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."); HAW. CONST. art. I, 
§ 5 (1978) ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of 
the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
race, religion, sex or ancestry."). 
2
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plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.ll In October of 1991, the circuit court granted the 
DOH's motion and found that the DOH was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.12 The court then dismissed the plain-
tiffs' complaint with prejudice. IS 
However, the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated and remanded 
the circuit court order.14 In a plurality opinion/Ii the supreme 
court held that the circuit court made improper factual find-
ings16 beyond the scope of a judgment on the pleadings. I? Addi-
11. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51. The following arguments were made by the DOH regard-
ing the plaintiffs' failure to state a claim: 
(1) the state's marriage laws "contemplate marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman"; (2) because the only legally 
recognized right to marry "is the right to enter a heterosexual 
marriage, [the) plaintiffs do not have a cognizable right, fun-
damental or otherwise, to enter into state-licensed homosexual 
marriages"; (3) the state's marriage laws do not "burden, pe-
nalize, infringe, or interfere in any way with the [plaintiffs') 
private relationships"; (4) the state is under no obligation "to 
take affirmative steps to provide homosexual unions with its 
official approval"; (5) the state's marriage laws "protect and 
foster and may help to perpetuate the basic family unit, re-
garded as vital to society, that provides status and a nurturing 
environment to children born to married persons" and, in ad-
dition, "constitute a statement of the moral values of the com-
munity in a manner that is not burdensome to [the) plain-
tiffs"; (6) assuming the plaintiffs are homosexuals (a fact not 
pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint), they "are neither a sus-
pect nor a quasi-suspect class and do not require heightened 
judicial solicitude"; and (7) even if heightened judicial solici-
tude is warranted, the state's marriage laws "are so removed 
from penalizing, burdening, harming, or otherwise interfering 
with [the) plaintiffs and their relationships and perform such 
a critical function in society that they must be sustained." 
[d. at 51-52 (quoting the supporting memoranda for the DOH's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings) (footnotes omitted). 
12. Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. at 6 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991). 
13. [d. 
14. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
15. Three opinions were filed. The prevailing plurality opinion was written by Jus-
tice Levinson and was joined by Chief Justice Moon. [d. at 48. James Bums, an Interme-
diate Court of Appeals Chief Judge, sitting on the court as a substitute justice, concurred 
with the plurality. [d. at 68. Walter M. Heen, another Intermediate Court of Appeals 
Judge sitting on the panel, filed a dissenting opinion. [d. at 70. Judge Heen's dissent 
would have been joined by another judge; however, the other judge's temporary assign-
ment to the court expired prior to the filing of the opinion. [d. at 48. 
16. [d. at 53-54. The supreme court noted that: 
[Without) any evidentiary record before it, the circuit court's 
... order granting [the DOH's) motion for judgment on the 
3
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tionally, the supreme court held that: 
[O]n the state of the bare record before us ... 
the circuit court erred when it concluded, as a 
matter of law, that: (1) homosexuals18 do not con-
stitute a "suspect class" for purposes of equal 
protection analysis under . . . the Hawaii Consti-
tution; (2) the classification created by [the Ha-
waii Marriage Law] is not subject to "strict scru-
tiny," but must satisfy only the "rational 
relationship" test; and (3) [the Hawaii Marriage 
Law] satisfies the rational relationship test be-
cause the legislature "obviously designed [it] to 
promote the general welfare interests of the com-
munity by sanctioning traditional man-woman 
pleadings contained a variety of findings of fact. For example, 
the circuit court "found" that: (1) [the Hawaii Marriage Law] 
"does not infringe upon a person's individuality or lifestyle de-
cisions, and none of the plaintiffs has provided testimony to 
the contrary"; (2) [the Hawaii Marriage Law] "does not ... 
restrict [or] burden. . . the exercise of the right to engage in a 
homosexual lifestyle"; (3) Hawaii has exhibited a "history of 
tolerance for all peoples and their cultures"; (4) "the plaintiffs 
have failed to show that they have been ostracized or op-
pressed in Hawaii and have opted instead to rely on a general 
statement of historic problems encountered by homosexuals 
which may not be relevant to Hawaii"; (5) "homosexuals in 
Hawaii have not been relegated to a position of 'political 
powerlessness.' ... [Tlhere is no evidence that homosexuals 
and the homosexual legislative agenda have failed to gain leg-
islative support in Hawaii"; (6) the "{p}laintiffs have failed to 
show that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for equal 
protection analysis under ... the Hawaii State Constitution"; 
(7) "the issue of whether homosexuality constitutes an immu-
table trait has generated much dispute in the relevant scien-
tific community"; and (8) [the Hawaii Marriage Law] "is obvi-
ously designed to promote the general welfare interests of the 
community by sanctioning traditional man-woman family 
units and procreation." 
[d. at 53-54 (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 
1991» (alterations in both original and quoted material) (footnote omitted). 
17. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54. A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be based 
solely on the content of the pleadings. [d. at 53. 
18. Interestingly, the Baehr court noted that the DOH, by virtue of its Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, was the party which put the question of homosexuality at 
issue. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52 n.12. The court observed that parties to "a union between a 
man and a woman" mayor may not be homosexuals and, conversely, parties to a same-
sex marriage could be either homosexuals or heterosexuals. [d. at 52 n.ll. It appears that 
to the Baehr court, a person's sexual orientation is theoretically distinct from the fact 
that he or she chooses to marry a man or a woman. 
4
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family units and procreation."Is 
After an exhaustive analysis, the supreme court found that 
the denial of marriage to same-sex couples did indeed implicate 
strict scrutiny equal protection analysis under the Hawaii Con-
stitution.20 Describing the circuit court's order as "run[ning] 
aground on the shoals of the Hawaii Constitution's Equal Pro-
tection Clause,"21 the court determined that unresolved factual 
questions precluded an entry of judgment, as a matter of law, in 
favor of the DOH22 and, therefore, remanded the case to the cir-
cuit court. 23 
On remand, in accordance with a strict scrutiny standard, 
the DOH will have the burden of demonstrating that the Hawaii 
Marriage Law furthers a compelling state interest and is nar-
rowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional 
rights.24 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY DOES NOT INCLUDE A FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Initially, the Baehr court noted that the right to privacy 
19. [d. (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 
1991)) (alterations in both original and quoted material) (footnote omitted). 
20. [d. at 67. In Hawaii, suspect categories are subject to a strict scrutiny standard 
and distinctions based on suspect categories are presumed to be unconstitutional unless 
the state can show compelling state interests which justify the offending classification. 
Nelson v. Miwa, 546 P.2d 1005, 1008 n.4 (Haw. 1976). 
21. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54. The court's decision rests on Hawaii's Equal Protection 
Clause which is more elaborate than the United States counterpart. Under the United 
States Constitution, no state may "deny; .. any person ... equal protection of the 
laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, while the Hawaii counterpart provides that "[n]o 
person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws, nor [their] civil rights ... 
because of race, religion, sex or ancestry." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1978) (emphasis 
added); see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59-60. 
22. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54-55. 
23. [d. at 68. 
24. [d. During the subsequent DOH motion for the court to reconsider or clarify its 
opinion, the court reiterated its instructions for remand. Motion for Reconsideration or 
Clarification, granted in part, 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993). The original plurality decision 
was effectively converted into an outright majority when Justice Nakayama took her seat 
on the five-member Hawaii Supreme Court and joined with Chief Justice Moon and Jus-
tice Levinson in the decision on the motion. [d.; see Robert Stouffer, Another View of 
Same-Gender Marriage, ISLAND LIFESTYLE, Jan. 1994, at 15, 15-17. 
5
Courson: Same-Sex Marriage
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
46 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:41 
under the Hawaii Constitution is treated as a fundamental right 
for purposes of constitutional analysis.211 The Hawaii Constitu-
tion expressly provides that the right to privacy may not be in-
fringed unless a compelling state interest is demonstrated.28 Ad-
ditionally, "the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right 
of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause."27 Therefore, the Baehr court needed to determine 
whether the fundamental right to privacy under the Hawaii 
Constitution included protection of marriages by same-sex 
couples. 
Emphasizing that as the "ultimate judicial tribunal" in Ha-
waii its authority to interpret and enforce the State's Constitu-
tion was final and unreviewable,28 the Baehr court noted that it 
could give broader privacy protection under the Hawaii Consti-
tution than was possible under the United States Constitution.29 
Nevertheless, the Baehr court determined that it was con-
strained by the privacy jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in defining the limits of Hawaii's right to privacy. so Thus, follow-
25. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55. During the Hawaii Constitutional Convention of 1978, the 
framers articulated: 
By amending the Constitution to include a separate and dis-
tinct privacy right, it is the intent of your Committee to insure 
that privacy is treated as a fundamental right for purposes of 
constitutional analysis .... It is a right that, though unstated 
in the federal Constitution, emanates from the penumbra of 
several guarantees of the Bill of Rights .... [TJhere has been 
some confusion as to the source of the right and the impor-
tance of it. . . . By inserting clear and specific language re-
garding this right into the Constitution, your Committee in-
tends to alleviate any possible confusion over the source of the 
right and the existence of it. 
Id. (quoting Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, 1 Proceedings, at 1024). 
26. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1978); see supra note 10. 
27. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978». The 
court admitted that the U.S. Supreme Court was "obviously contemplating unions be-
tween men and women when it ruled that the right to marry was fundamental." Id. at 
56. 
28. Id. at 57 (citing State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988». 
29. Id. at 57; see also cases cited infra note 96. 
30. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. The Hawaii Supreme Court had previously held that the 
privacy right found in the Hawaii Constitution was similar to the federal right of privacy. 
State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Haw. 1983). The Mueller court was guided in this 
determination by the proceedings of Hawaii's constitutional framers who described the 
right of privacy as being similar to the right as discussed in such United States Supreme 
Court cases as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Mueller, 671 P.2d at 1357-58 
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ing federal jurisprudence, the court declined to extend the fun-
damental right to marry to same-sex couples, stating that: 
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex mar-
riage is so rooted in the traditions and collective 
conscience of our people that failure to recognize 
it would violate the fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions. Neither do we believe 
that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if it were 
sacrificed.31 
Accordingly, the court held that the right to privacy did not 
provide the applicant couples with a fundamental constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage.32 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE HAWAII CONSTITUTION Is IM-
PLICATED WHEN THE STATE USES ITs SOVEREIGN POWER TO 
DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF SEX 
Although the Baehr court rejected the right to privacy 
claim, it gave favorable consideration to the plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection claim.33 As a threshold matter, the court noted that 
"[t]he power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function re-
served exclusively to the respective states."3. This sovereign 
power is a monopoly which had been codified by statute for over 
a hundred years.31i Further, "by its plain language, the Hawaii 
(citing Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, 1 Proceedings, at 1024). 
31. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. The court's holding on this point echoed the now familiar 
refrain from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on fundamental rights and privacy. For 
example, in Griswold, the Supreme Court observed that judges, "determining which 
rights are fundamental," must look not to "personal and private notions," but to the 
"traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is 
"so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental," Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoted in Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57); and in Palko v. Connecti-
cut, the Supreme Court propositioned that only rights implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty can be deemed fundamental. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (cited 
in Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 n.16). 
32. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 58. 
35. [d. The court noted that: 
So zealously has this court guarded the state's role as the ex-
7
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Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination against 
any person in the exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis 
of sex."36 
When the state, through its marriage monopoly, denies mar-
ital status to a same-sex couple, it deprives them of the "multi-
plicity of rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that particu-
lar relation. "37 The Hawaii Marriage Law implicitly restricts the 
marriage relation to a male and a female. s8 However, the consti-
tutionality of such a restriction was not to be determined simply 
elusive progenitor of the marital partnership that it declared, 
over seventy years ago, that 'common law' marriages-i.e., 
'marital' unions existing in the absence of a state-issued li-
cense and not performed by a person or society possessing 
governmental authority to solemnize marriages-would no 
longer be recognized in the Territory of Hawaii. 
[d. (citing Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397,404-05 (1920)). 
36. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60; see HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1978); supra note 10. 
37. [d. at 59. Among the rights and benefits identified by the court were: state in-
come tax advantages, public assistance advantages, community property rights, inheri-
tance rights, award of child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings, the 
right to spousal support, the right to enter into premarital agreements, the right to 
change of name, the right to file a nonsupport action, post-divorce rights relating to sup-
port and property division, the benefit of the spousal privilege and confidential marital 
communications, real property benefits and exemptions, and the right to bring a wrong-
ful death action. [d. See also Brooke Oliver, Note, Contracting for Cohabitation: Adapt-
ing the California Statutory Marital Contract to Life Partnership Agreements Between 
Lesbian, Gay or Unmarried Heterosexual Couples, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 899, 900 
(1993) (identifying over 450 California statutes that involve the rights, duties and privi-
leges pertaining to marriage that together comprise the California civil marital contract). 
38. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60. The requisites of a valid marriage contract are enumer-
ated in the Hawaii Marriage Law as follows: 
In order to make valid the marriage contract, it shall be 
necessary that: 
(1) The respective parties do not stand in relation to each 
other of ancestor and descendant of any degree whatsoever, 
brother and sister of the half as well as to the whole blood, 
uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, whether the relationship is 
legitimate or illegitimate; 
(3) The man does not at the time have any lawful wife 
living and that the woman does not at the time have any law-
ful husband living; 
(7) The marriage ceremony be performed in the State by 
a person or society with a valid license to solemnize marriages 
and the man and the woman to be married and the person 
performing the marriage ceremony be all physically present at 
the same place and time for the marriage ceremony. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985) (emphasis added). 
8
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because the legislature contemplated unions between a man and 
woman when it enacted the Hawaii Marriage Law.8s The court 
noted that constitutional violations are not sanitized by legisla-
tive action.40 
However, the DOH argued that no sex-based discrimination 
had taken place.41 The main thrust of the DOH's argument was 
that persons of the same sex had no right to marry one another 
because the definition and customary use of the word "mar-
riage" includes only the special relationship between a man and 
a woman.41l Very simply, two members of the same sex could not 
marry because the definition of marriage did not include that 
configuration as a possibility. Thus, no impermissible discrimi-
nation implicating equal protection had taken place because of 
the plaintiffs' innate biologic inability as couples to achieve mar-
ried status.48 
The Baehr court distinguished two of the cases relied on by 
the DOH to support its premise, Baker u. Nelson44 and De 
Santo u. Barnsley,41S describing them as "demonstrably inappo-
site to the appellant couples' claim."46 The Baker court had ob-
served that dictionaries defined marriage as a union between 
persons of the opposite sex.47 Additionally, same-sex marriages 
were, not surprisingly, outside of the intent of the "original 
draftsmen" of the Minnesota marriage statutes which had ex-
isted since the "territorial days."48 After observing this, the 
Baker court held, with regard to a denial of a same-sex marriage 
request, simply that (a) the state marriage law precluded same-
sex marriages, and (b) the United States Constitution was not 
offended.4s Unlike Baehr u. Lewin, no state constitutional ques-
39. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60 n.20. 
40. [d. On this point, the Baehr court noted City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) ("It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by 
referendum or otherwise, could not order ... action violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause."). 
41. Answering Brief of DOH at 21. 
42. [d. at 7. 
43. [d. at 21. 
44. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
45. 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 
46. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
47. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 n.l. 
48. [d. at 186. 
49. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87. 
9
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tions had apparently been raised or addressed, therefore, the 
Baehr court deemed Baker "inapposite."IIO 
The same fate fell to De Santo, where the court had held 
that common law same-sex marriage did not exist in Pennsylva-
nia.1I1 The Baehr court called this result "irrelevant to the pre-
sent case. "112 After reviewing several authorities, including 
Baker, the De Santo court concluded that "common law mar-
riage has been regarded as a relationship that can be established 
only between two persons of opposite sex."IIS However, the De 
Santo court did not address how a denial of same-sex marriage 
violated Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment because the 
issue had not been raised in the lower court.1I4 Thus, the Baehr 
court distinguished both Baker and De Santo by the failures of 
those courts to address the relevant state constitutional concerns 
at issue in Baehr. 
The Baehr court singled out two other cases relied on by 
the DOH, Jones v. Hallahanlill and Singer v. Hara,1I6 for a more 
in-depth analysis.1I7 In Jones, two Kentucky women sought re-
view of a marriage license denial,ll6 The Jones court observed 
that the Kentucky marriage statutes did not specifically prohibit 
marriage between persons of the same sex. liB However, the stat-
utes did contain references to "the male and female of the spe-
cies."60 Affirming the denial of the marriage license, the Jones 
court held that: 
[M]arriage has always been considered as the 
union of a man and a woman and we have been 
presented with no authority to the contrary. 
It appears to us that appellants are prevented 
from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky 
. . . but rather by their own incapability of enter-
50. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
51. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 952. 
52. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
53. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 953-54. 
54. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 956; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
55. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). 
56. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974). 
57. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
58. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589. 
59. [d. at 589. The Kentucky marriage statutes are similar to Hawaii's in this re-
gard. See Hawaii Marriage Law, partially set out, supra note 38. 
60. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589 n.1. 
10
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ing into a marriage as that term is defined. 
A license to enter into a status or a relation-
ship which the parties are incapable of achieving 
is a nullity.81 
51 
With respect to Jones, the Baehr court noted that the ap-
pellants there asserted neither federal nor state equal protection 
rights.8s Thus, unlike the Baehr court, the Jones court did not 
need to address or distinguish the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia. 83 
Like the plaintiffs in Jones, in Singer v. Hara, a same-sex 
couple sought judicial review after they were denied a marriage 
license.84 On appeal, the couple argued that the denial violated 
the Washington Equal Rights Amendment86 and various provi-
sions of the United States Constitution.68 The Singer court held 
that neither the Federal nor State constitutions were offended 
by the denial.67 The couple was "not denied a marriage license 
because of their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage license 
because of the nature of marriage itself. "68 The Baehr court ob-
served that "but for the fact that the Singer court was unable to 
discern sexual discrimination in the state's marriage laws, it 
would have engaged in a 'strict scrutiny' analysis. "69 
In Loving v. Virginia,70 the Virginia courts had declared 
61. [d. at 589. 
62. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
63. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See discussion, infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. 
64. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1188. 
65. [d. at 1190. Washington's Equal Rights Amendment reads: "Equality of rights 
and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." 
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972). 
66. Including the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Singer, 522 P.2d at 
1188-89. 
67. [d. at 1197. 
68. [d. at 1196. 
69. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 n.27. The Singer court had distinguished Loving, noting 
that the United States Supreme Court "did not change the basic definition of marriage 
as the legal union of one man and one woman; rather, [it] merely held that the race of 
the man or woman desiring to enter that relationship could not be considered by the 
state in granting a marriage license." Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192 n.8. 
70. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Lovings were an interracial Virginia couple who were 
married out of state and were later convicted of violating Virginia's miscegenation laws 
after returning there to reside. [d. at 2-3. The trial judge suspended their sentence, how-
ever, on the condition that they leave the state and not return to Virginia together for a 
period of 25 years. [d. at 3. Four years later, the Lovings sought to vacate the judgment 
11
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that interracial marriage simply could not exist because the De-
ity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural.71 The 
Baehr court observed that "[w]ith all due respect to the Virginia 
courts of a bygone era, we do not believe that trial judges are the 
ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Lov-
ing amply demonstrates, constitutional law may ·mandate, like it 
or not, that customs change with an evolving social order."72 
The Baehr court was unpersuaded by the DOH argument 
that same-sex marriage was an innate impossibility because mar-
riage only included a man-woman option.78 The court analogized 
the DOH argument to the rationale used by the courts of Vir-
ginia to deny interracial marriages, i.e., that interracial mar-
riages were impossible because the Deity had declared them un-
naturap· Characterizing the argument as "circular" and an 
"exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry," the Baehr court 
dismissed contentions that the marriage license had been denied 
because of the nature of marriage itself and not because of the 
sex of the applicants.7G Thus, similar to Loving where marriage 
'on the ground that the miscegenation laws they were convicted under were unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment. [d. When the Virginia courts refused to set 
aside their sentences, the Lovings pressed their appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court. [d. at 3-4. 
71. During the initial conviction and sentencing of the Lovings, the trial court had 
invoked the name of God to support the proposition that interracial marriages should 
remain illegal stating that: "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay 
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with 
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated 
the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 
(quoting the trial judge) (quoted in Baehr, 852 P.2d at 62). In upholding the constitu-
tionality of Virginia's miscegenation laws in the wake of the Loving's subsequent chal-
lenge to their conviction, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its earlier 
decision in Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). The Naim court stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not prohibit Virginia from 
enacting legislation to "preserve the racial integrity of its citizens ... so that it shall not 
have a mongrel breed of citizens." [d. at 756. The Naim court concluded that the State 
may legislate "to prevent the obliteration of racial pride" and does not need to "permit 
the corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship." 
[d. The United States Supreme Court characterized this as "obviously an endorsement 
of the doctrine of White Supremacy." Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
72. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. Other courts have come to different conclusions. For instance, the court in 
Baker v. Nelson distinguished Loving, stating that there was a "clear distinction" be-
tween marital restrictions based on race and those based upon the fundamental differ-
ence in sex. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
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was finally extended to interracial couples, extending marriage 
to a same-sex couple should be based on an "evolving social or-
der," not the will of a Deity that predetermined a fundamental 
and unchanging definition of marriage.7s By regulating access to 
the marriage status on the basis of the applicants' sex, the court 
found that an equal protection issue arose. '17 
C. EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE HAWAII CONSTITUTION RE-
QUIRES LAWS CONTAINING SEx-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS TO 
P ASS STRICT SCRUTINY 
The Hawaii Marriage Law regulated access to the marital 
status on the basis of sex, therefore, the law established a sex-
based classification.78 However, in order to decide whether the 
sex-based classification at issue was constitutional, the Baehr 
court needed to determine what level of equal protection analy-
sis to apply under the Hawaii Constitution. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny analysis 
to challenges of laws which classify on the basis of suspect cate-
gories7s or impinge on fundamental rights.80 These laws are pre-
sumed unconstitutional unless the state shows a compelling 
state interest81 that justifies the classification,82 and the laws are 
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitu-
tional rights.83 
However, for laws which classify on a basis other than sus-
76. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. 
77. [d. at 60. 
78. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64. 
79. A suspect classification exists where the class of individuals formed by a statute, 
on its face or as administered, has been" ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected 
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process." [d. at 72 (Heen, J., dissenting) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973). 
80. [d. at 63 (citing Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978». 
81. A "compelling state interest" is a "[tJerm used to uphold state action in the face 
of attack grounded on Equal Protection . . . because of serious need for such state ac-
tion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 283 (6th ed. 1990). See infra note 93 for an example of a 
"compelling state interest" as determined in Hawaii. 
82. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (citing Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167). 
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pect classifications and which do not infringe on fundamental 
rights, the court utilizes the rational basis test.S• Under this test, 
the court will uphold the law if there exists any reasonable justi-
fication for the legislative enactment.SII Somewhere between ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny, the Hawaii Supreme Court has 
also recognized "heightened" scrutiny.se 
The genesis of what level of scrutiny to apply to sex-based 
classifications under the Hawaii Constitution began when the 
Hawaii Supreme Court evaluated Holdman v. Dlim.S? In 
Holdman, a woman prison visitorSs sued officials when she was 
refused admittance because she was not wearing a brassiere.s9 
The refusal derived from a directive, promulgated by the Acting 
Prison Administrator, that "visitors will be properly dressed. 
Women visitors are asked to be fully clothed, including under-
garments. Provocative attire is discouraged. "90 The trial court 
dismissed the action at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.91 On 
appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed.92 
The Holdman court declined to set an absolute standard for 
what scrutiny to apply to sex-based classifications, concluding 
that the directive would survive strict scrutiny by reason of a 
compelling state interest if strict scrutiny were held to apply.98 
84. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64. Under the rational basis U!st, the court inquires whether 
a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. If it does, the statute will pass 
constitutional muster. Most statutes are cloaked by the courts with a presumption of 
constitutionality, primarily out of due regard for the legislative decision making process. 
Nelson, 546 P.2d at 1008; see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) ("Judicial deference is based, not on relative factfinding competence, but 
on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide."). 
85. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64; see also Estate of Coates v. Pacific Eng'g, 791 P.2d 1257, 
1260 (Haw. 1990) (applying the rational basis test to the Hawaii Workers' Compensation 
statute, finding legitimate the state interest of securing guaranteed compensation for in-
jured parties and their dependents, even though precluding claims by non-dependent 
parents). 
86. See infra note 94. 
87. 581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978). 
88. The visitor happened to be the executive director of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union of Hawaii. [d. at 1166 n.l. On appeal, it was not suggested that she was re-
fused entry into the prison for reasons other than her lack of brassiere. [d. 
89. [d. at 1166. 
90. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (quoting Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1166) (emphasis omitted). 
91. See Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1165-66. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 1168. The court determined that maintenance of order and control in a 
prison was a vital governmental objective. [d. at 1167. Additionally, the court noted that 
14
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Nevertheless, the Holdman court enunciated some important 
principles that would buttress the logic of the Baehr court's 
opinion. First, the court established that sex-based classifica-
tions are subject to either strict or intermediate level scrutiny 
for purposes of equal protection analysis under the Hawaii Con-
stitution.94 Second, for purposes of analysis, the court assumed 
that sex-based classifications were subject to strict scrutiny.911 
Third, the court reaffirmed the principle that Hawaii's citizens 
could be given greater protections under the Hawaii Constitu-
tion than those recognized under the United States Constitu-
tion.98 Finally, the court looked to United States Supreme Court 
lack of a brassiere had been controversial and regarded as sexually provocative by some 
members of society. [d. Thus, dress restrictions imposed on women visitors were required 
for maintenance of order and control in the prison and related to this vital government 
objective out of the assumption that inmates would regard the lack of a brassiere as 
provocative. [d. at 1168. Consequently, the court determined that the directive had a 
sufficiently substantial relationship to the achievement of the important governmental 
objective of prison security that it would withstand the test of strict scrutiny by reason 
of a compelling state interest. [d. at 1169. While declining to enunciate a standard of 
review for an equal rights claim, the court nevertheless found on the facts that the equal 
protection challenge had not been sustained. [d. at 1170. 
94. Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167-70. The Holdman court noted that under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, sex-based classifications were gov-
erned by a standard between rational basis and strict scrutiny. [d. at 1167 (quoting Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives."». 
In decisions subsequent to Holdman, the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
sex-based classifications were subject, at the very least, to "intermediate scrutiny" under 
the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65 n.31; see State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 
988 (Haw. 1985) ("Even if [a gender-neutral anti-prostitution statute was] deemed to set 
up a gender-based classification, it would be invalid only if it did not serve important 
government objectives and was not substantially related to achieving those objectives."); 
see also State v. Rivera, 612 P.2d 526, 529 (Haw. 1980) (upholding a rape statute that set 
up a gender-based classification while noting that under the State Equal Protection 
Clause, a sex-based distinction must serve governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand judicial scrutiny). 
95. Noting that the more stringent compelling state interest test would be satisfied 
if it were held to be applicable, the court reserved for future consideration the applica-
tion of this test to assess sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Hawaii Constitution. Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1168. 
96. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65-66; Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1168; State v. Texeira, 433 P.2d 
593, 597 n.2 (Ha~. 1967) ("As long as we afford defendants the minimum protection 
required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution, we are unrestricted in interpreting the constitution ofthis state to afford greater 
protection."); State v. Grahovac, 480 P.2d 148, 151-52 (Haw. 1971) (holding that the 
court was free to go beyond the minimal requisites of the Federal Constitution in pro-
tecting one's right of silence under the State Constitution); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 
657,664 (Haw. 1971) (noting that although the United States Supreme Court is the final 
arbiter of the meaning of the United States Constitution and its Amendments, the Ha-
15
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cases for guidance.97 
Of the United States Supreme Court cases cited in 
Holdman, the Baehr court singled out Frontiero v. Richardson98 
for analysis.99 Frontiero involved the right of a female member 
of the armed services to claim her spouse as a "dependent" for 
the purposes of obtaining· increased housing allowances and 
other benefits on a par with male members.loo According to the 
regulations then existing, a serviceman could claim his wife as a 
"dependent" without regard to whether she was, in fact, depen-
dent upon him for any part of her support. IOI A servicewoman, 
on the other hand, could not claim her husband as a "depen-
dent" unless he was in fact dependent upon her for over one-
half of his support. I02 Thus, the question was whether this dif-
ferential treatment constituted unconstitutional discrimination 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. IOS In concurring opinions, eight Supreme Court justices 
concluded that the regulations established impermissibly differ-
ential treatment between men and women. I04 
Nonetheless, there was disagreement on the level of judicial 
scrutiny applicable to statutory sex-based discrimination. In a 
four-justice plurality opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that sex-
based classifications, like those based on race, alienage, and na-
tional origin, are inherently suspect and should be subjected to 
waii Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Hawaii Constitution and that nothing 
prevents Hawaii from providing greater protections than required by the United States 
Constitution); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 57-62 (Haw. 1974) (extending the protec-
tions of the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond those of textually parallel provisions in the 
Federal Bill of Rights resulting in greater restrictions on police in Hawaii who conduct 
searches incident to lawful arrests); State v. Manzo, 573 P.2d 945, 953 (Haw. 1977) (rec-
ognizing the court had the power to give wider protections to obscene material under the 
Hawaii Constitution than accorded under the Federal Constitution). 
97. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66. 
98. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
99. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66-67. 
100. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. at 679. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it is interpreted to forbid discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be 
violative of due process. [d. at 680 n.5. 
104. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-92. Justice Rehnquist filed the sole dissenting 
opinion. 
16
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strict judicial scrutiny.10& 
However, in a three-justice concurring opinion, Justice Pow-
ell maintained that while the challenged statutes unconstitution-
ally discriminated against servicewomen, a finding that sex was a 
suspect classification invoking strict scrutiny should have been 
deferred. loe Justice Powell contended that the Equal Rights 
Amendment, approved by Congress and submitted for ratifica-
tion by the States would, if adopted, resolve the very question at 
issue in Frontiero. 107 According to Justice Powell, the Court 
should not "pre-empt by judicial action a major political deci-
sion which is currently in the process of resolution."108 
Finally, Justice Stewart concurred in a single sentence, sim-
ply agreeing that the statutes at issue worked an "invidious 
discrimination. "109 
Frontiero demonstrated to the Baehr court that a large ma-
jority of the United States Supreme Court would have subjected 
statutory sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny in the pres-
ence of the Equal Rights Amendment. llo Since Hawaii has an 
equal rights amendment,111 the Baehr court concluded that it 
was time to resolve the precise level of scrutiny to apply to sex-
based classifications. ll2 Consequently, the court held that sex is 
a "suspect category" for purposes of equal protection analysis 
under the Hawaii Constitution.ll8 Therefore, the Hawaii Mar-
riage Law, and the sex-based classification it contains, must now 
105. 1d. at 683. 
106. 1d. at 691-92. 
107.1d. 
108. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691-92. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was 
passed by Congress in 1972, but was defeated in 1982 when it fell three states short of 
ratification. See John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 508, 519 (1993). As the twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution, the ERA 
would have provided that "[e)quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." 1d. at 519 n.75; see 
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
109. 1d. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
110. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. 
111. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State 
on account of sex. The legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this section." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1978). 
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be subject to strict scrutiny.114 Accordingly, the court held that 
the Hawaii Marriage Law is presumptively unconstitutional and 
will require a showing by the DOH that the sex-based classifica-
tion is justified by compelling state interests.11& 
D. PLURALITY'S CONCLUSION 
Because sex-based classifications had now been elevated to 
the status of "suspect category," and the Hawaii Marriage Law 
denied access to the marital status based on the sex of the appli-
cant couples, the plurality held that the circuit court erroneously 
granted the DOH's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. ll6 
Therefore, they vacated the circuit court's judgment and re-
'manded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings con-
sistent with their opinion.ll7 The burden now rests on the DOH 
to rebut the presumption that the Hawaii Marriage Law is un-
constitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state 
interests and is narrowly tailored to avoid an unnecessary in-
fringement of constitutional rights. 118 
IV. CONCURRENCE 
While concurring with the plurality that the circuit court 
erroneously granted the DOH's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, Judge Burns believed that a genuine issue of material 
fact remained.11s Although he agreed that the Hawaii Constitu-
tion mandates that any State action that discriminates against a 
person because of his or her "sex" requires a strict scrutiny anal-
ysis, he believed the word "sex" referred only to aspects that 
were "biologically fated."llIO Thus, to Judge Burns, the question 
114. [d. 
115. [d. Interestingly, unlike the court in Holdman, the Baehr court expressed no 
opinion on whether the DOH would be able to show such a compelling state interest. 
116. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
117. [d. 
118. [d.; see Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification, granted in part, 852 P.2d 
74 (Haw. 1993). As stated supra note 24, Justice Nakayama took her seat on the Hawaii 
Supreme Court and joined the plurality in the Motion for Reconsideration or Clarifica-
tion, effectively converting the holding to that of an outright majority. 
119. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
120. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69. Judge Burns observed that there was considerable de-
bate of whether a person's sexual orientation was a product of biology or environment. 
[d. He believed that the Hawaii Constitution only provides protection to those sexual 
18
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of whether homosexuality was "biologically fated" would need to 
be answered in order to determine whether the Hawaii Constitu-
tion bars discrimination against same-sex marriages. 121 
The plurality, however, took exception to Judge Burns' de-
termination that sexual orientation must be "biologically fated" 
in order to be protected.122 They wrote that for the purposes of 
constitutional analysis germane to this case, it does not matter 
whether homosexuality is "an immutable trait," i.e., "biologi-
cally fated," because it did not matter whether the plaintiffs 
were homosexuals.123 The determination of the immutability of 
homosexuality was not necessary to: 1) determine whether the 
Hawaii Marriage Law denied same-sex couples access to the 
marital status and its related rights and benefits, 2) support the 
conclusion that Hawaii's regulation of marital access, on the ba-
sis of sex, gave rise to an equal protection violation, or 3) exer-
cise strict scrutiny review since the plurality was "unable to per-
ceive any conceivable relevance of [homosexuality] to ... 
whether [the Hawaii Marriage Law] furthers compelling state 
interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridge-
ments of constitutional rights. "124 
V. DISSENT 
The dissenting writer, Judge Heen, agreed with the plurality 
that the applicant same-sex couples did not have a fundamental 
right to marriage under the Hawaii State Constitution.1211 This 
was one of the few points he did agree with. Judge Heen did not 
agree with the plurality that the applicant couples had a "civil 
right" to same-sex marriage;126 the Hawaii Marriage Law uncon-
characteristics that were "biologically fated." 1d. at 70. 
121. 1d. at 70. 
122. 1d. at 53 n.14. 
123. 1d. 
124. 1d. 
125. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 70. 
126. The plurality wrote that Judge Heen made some basic "misconstructions" of 
their opinion. 1d. at 67. Calling his conclusions "premature," they pointed out that they 
did not hold that the plaintiffs had a "civil right" to a same-sex marriage. 1d. They 
pointed out that they had noted that the United States Supreme Court had recognized 
marriage to be a basic civil right for over 50 years. 1d. Further, this recognition of mar-
riage as a civil right was relevant to the prohibition in the Hawaii Constitution against 
discrimination in the exercise of a person's civil rights on the basis of sex. 1d. 
19
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stitutionally discriminates against same-sex applicants who seek 
a marriage license;127 the applicant couples were entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing where a strict scrutiny standard of review 
would be applied; or the Hawaii Marriage Law is presumptively 
unconstitutional.128 Additionally, Judge Heen regarded the de-
nial of statutory benefits accorded to legal, heterosexual mar-
riages as a claim best left to the legislature.129 
Judge Heen asserted that Loving v. Virginia 130 does not 
stand for the proposition that the "civil right" to marriage 
should be extended to same-sex couples, because Loving in-
volved only race.18l Because the Hawaii Marriage Law applied 
equally to both sexes, he concluded that equal protection under 
the HawaH Constitution was not offended.181 The plurality was 
quick to point out the deficiency they perceived in Judge Heen's 
reasoning, observing that his underlying rationale had been ex-
pressly considered and rejected in Loving.188 Nevertheless, Judge 
, 
127. Again, the plurality took exception to Judge Heen's characterization. They 
pointed out that what they had held was that the Hawaii Marriage Law denied same-sex 
couples access to marriage, thus implicating the Hawaii Constitution's Equal Protection 
Clause. [d. at 67. 
128. [d. at 70. 
129. [d. See supra note 37 for a non-exhaustive list of benefits accorded to married 
couples. 
130. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
131. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 70. 
132. [d. at 71. Judge Heen did agree with the plurality that the applicant couples' 
sexual preferences are completely irrelevant. [d. at 71 n.3. However, Judge Heen believed 
the plurality missed the real thrust of why sexual preferences were irrelevant to the Ha-
waii Marriage Law, i.e., the Law applied equally to both sexes. [d. Since all males and 
females are treated alike, the Hawaii Marriage Law did not create a "suspect" classifica-
tion based on gender. [d. at 71. For Judge Heen, it was sufficient that "[a1 male cannot 
obtain a license to marry another male, and a female cannot obtain a license to marry 
another female. Neither sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does not have, 
and neither sex is being denied a right or benefit that the other has." [d. 
133. [d. at 67-68. The Commonwealth of Virginia contended in Loving that since its 
miscegenation statutes punished both interracial marriage participants equally, despite 
the statute's racial classifications, no "invidious discrimination" based upon race oc-
curred. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8. In Loving, the United States Supreme Court rejected "the 
notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is 
enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of 
all invidious racial discriminations." [d. The Court noted that equal application of stat-
utes which contained racial classifications did not immunize them "from the very heavy 
burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of 
state statutes drawn according to race." [d. at 8-9. By substituting the word "sex" for 
"race" and the Hawaii Equal Rights Amendment for the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Baehr court believed Loving to be identical to the case before it, yielding the same con-
clusion that it had reached. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
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Heen did not find the analogy between the race-based classifica-
tion in Loving and the sex-based classification of the Hawaii 
Marriage Law persuasive, claiming that the "operative distinc-
tion lies in the relationship which is described by the term 'mar-
riage' itself, and that relationship is the legal union of one man 
and one woman."IS4 Judge Heen agreed with the DOH and the 
courts which had reached a result contrary to that of the plural-
ity.m Judge Heen borrowed the language and reasoning of the 
Singer court when he wrote that: 
[A]ppellants are not being denied entry into the 
marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, 
they are being denied entry into the marriage re-
lationship because of the recognized definition of 
that relationship as one which may be entered 
into only by two persons who are members of the 
opposite sex.ISG 
The plurality had called this reasoning ·"tautological and 
circular. "IS7 
VI. CRITIQUE 
After writing an exhaustive opinion which examined many 
cases, the plurality authoritatively held that sex-based classifica-
tions were subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitu-
134. [d. at 71. 
135. [d.; see Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a 
lesbian couple was prevented from marrying by their incapability of entering into a mar-
riage as that term is defined); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal 
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (holding the state marriage law precluded same-sex mar-
riages and the United States Constitution was not offended by this preclusion); De Santo 
v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding common law marriage was a 
relationship that could be established only between persons of the opposite sex); and 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 
(1974) (holding neither the Federal nor State constitutions were offended by the denial 
of the marriage license and that the applicant couple was denied a marriage license be-
cause the nature of marriage did not include a same-sex configuration). See discussion, 
supra part III.C. 
136. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (quoting Singer, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192). 
137. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. One author describes the Singer quotation as both "con-
tradictory and circular," pointing out that the quote says that the reason the applicant 
couple was "denied equal protection of the laws is not because of their sex, but because 
of their sex; second, it says that the reason same-sex couples cannot marry is because 
same-sex couples cannot marry." Otis R. Damslett, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555, 574 (1993). 
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tion.138 In so doing, the plurality almost incidentally, and per-
haps, accidentally, marked a victory for "gay rights." However, 
by characterizing Baehr v. Lewin as a "sex" issue rather than a 
"homosexual" one, the plurality has divested legal reasoning 
from practical reality. 
Although the plurality observed that the DOH was the 
party which put the plaintiffs' homosexuality at issue,189 the fact 
remains that a same-sex couple is, for all practical purposes, 
synonymous with a homosexual couple. As the court points out, 
it is theoretically possible for a same-sex union to exist where 
the parties are, nevertheless, heterosexual.uo However, simple 
logic and common sense dictate that these configurations would 
be somewhat rare since the marital relationship is typically one 
where emotions, intimacy and sex occur.141 Therefore, it can be 
stated with objective reasonableness that opposite-sex marriage 
partners would be heterosexual and same-sex marriage partners 
would be homosexual. Regardless, it is not necessary to illustrate 
the absurd or the very rare; the applicant couples in Baehr v. 
Lewin are homosexuals and, as homosexuals, were selected for 
their role as plaintiffs to test the Hawaii Marriage Law.14II All 
wordplay aside, the core issue at stake in Baehr v. Lewin is 
whether to extend a basic civil right in our society to 
homosexuals. 148 
It must be noted that not all gay or lesbian Americans wish 
to achieve parity in civil rights with heterosexual America 
through the institution of marriage. Some see marriage as a 
"sexist, patriarchal institution that lesbian and gay people 
should not be seeking to enter."144 However, advocates counter 
that same-sex marriage should be a high priority because "as 
long as lesbian and gay people are denied this privilege, they are 
138. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. 
139. Id. at 52 n.12. 
140. Id. at 51 n.ll.; see discussion supra note 18. 
141. The question of whether sex is inherent in marriage is a premise that may be 
open to argument. 
142. Michelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, OUT, Dec. 1993 at 69, 72. 
143. In his concurrence, Judge Burns at least considered the fact that the sexuality 
of the plaintiffs was relevant, albeit only those aspects of sexuality that are "biologically 
fated." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69·70. In so doing, he explicitly mentions the word "homosex· 
ual," whereas the plurality had determined sexual orientation to be irrelevant to their 
holding. See discussion supra section IV. 
14. Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321 (1991) (citations omitted). 
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denied full citizenship."I411 Andrew Sullivan, the gay conserva-
tive editor of The New Republic, argues that equal access to 
marriage is the critical measure necessary for full gay equality.14s 
He states that: 
[T]he marriage ban deals with the core of what it 
is to be a member of civil society. Marriage is not 
simply a private contract; it is a social and public 
recognition of a private commitment. As such it is 
the highest public recognition of our personal in-
tegrity. Denying it to gay people is the most pub-
lic affront possible to civil equality .... In con-
temporary America, marriage has become a way 
in which the state recognizes an emotional and ec-
onomic commitment of two people to each other 
for life. No law requires children to consummate 
it. And within that definition, there is no civil way 
it can logically be denied homosexuals, except as 
a pure gesture of public disapproval.147 
Whether or not all of gay and lesbian America embraces the 
idea, the court in Baehr v. Lewin has brought same-sex marriage 
significantly closer to a reality. However, by utilizing a "back-
door" approach rather than addressing the real issue of ex-
tending a basic civil right to homosexuals, the court has engaged 
in the same type of circular reasoning that it found objectiona-
ble in Jones and Singer. 148 Here, the court finds that equal pro-
tection of the laws is offended, not because the plaintiffs are 
homosexual, but because the plaintiffs are denied access to 
marriage on account of being the same sex. Not only does this 
approach offend the sensibilities by characterizing an obvious is-
sue as something else via legalistic legerdemain, it offends many 
gays and lesbians by continuing to treat homosexuals as second-
class citizens who deserve protection under the laws only be-
cause the legislature was not careful when it drafted its statutes. 
145. [d. at 322 (citations omitted). 
146. Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality: a New Case for a New Begin-
ning, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 24. 
147. [d. 
148. As discussed, supra part I1LB, the courts in Singer v. Hara and Jones v. Halla-
han, found that applicant same-sex couples were not denied marriage licenses because of 
their sex, but, rather, were denied marriage licenses because of the nature of marriage. 
The Baehr court had termed this "circular" and an "exercise in tortured and conclusory 
sophistry." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. 
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Defending its holding and the underlying logic, the Baehr 
court observed that: 
The result we reach today is in complete harmony 
with the Loving Court's observation that any 
state's powers to regulate marriage are subject to 
the constraints imposed by the constitutional 
right to the equal protection of the laws.I '9 If it 
should ultimately be determined that the mar-
riage laws of Hawaii impermissibly discriminate 
against the appellants, based on the suspect cate-
gory of sex, then that would be the result of the 
interrelation of existing legislation. lGO 
[W]hether the legislation under review is wise or 
unwise is a matter with which we have nothing to 
do. Whether it ... work[s] well or work[s] ill 
presents a question entirely irrelevant to the is-
sue. The only legitimate inquiry we can make is 
whether it is constitutional. If it is not, its virtues, 
if it have any, cannot save it; if it is, its faults 
cannot be invoked to accomplish its destruction. 
If the provisions of the Constitution be not up-
held when they pinch as well as when they com-
fort, they may as well be abandoned. m 
One author has written that "[s]omewhere among the many 
states with constitutions that explicitly protect rights to equal 
protection, freedom of religion, liberty, and privacy, it is possible 
that a court will be found that will enforce those lofty guaran-
tees and provide all its citizens equal access to the marriage in-
stitution."1112 Hawaii may eventually be one' of those "many 
states." However, the Hawaiian court would have more credibil-
ity if it enforced these "lofty guarantees" with a clear statement 
that gay and lesbian unions deserve as much dignity and respect 
as heterosexual unions and not simply shroud equal protection 
for same-sex unions in the mist of sex-based classifications. 
149. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 7). 
150. [d. 
151. [d. (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Suth-
erland, J., dissenting». 
152. Otis R. Damslet, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555, 590 
(1993). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Hawaii's tentative steps towards same-sex marriage has fu-
eled speculation on the effect such a union would have in other 
states.lIlS Baehr v. Lewin becomes important not just for what 
may eventually happen in Hawaii, but also for these national 
implications. 
The traditional rule is that a marriage is valid everywhere if 
valid under the law of the state where the marriage takes 
place.1G4 However, when a claimed incident of marriage is sought 
to be enjoyed in a state where such enjoyment violates strong 
public policy, a marriage otherwise valid will be denied effect.lGG 
If the DOH cannot find a "compelling state interest," and Ha-
waii eventually legalizes same-sex marriage, at least some states 
will likely refuse to recognize such legal unions.m At some point, 
the United States Supreme Court may intervene as the final ar-
biter of disputes among the many states. 
The Loving case demonstrates that the Supreme Court is 
willing to intervene when states fail to recognize marriages on 
constitutionally impermissible grounds. m In Loving, the plain-
tiffs were able to enter into a legal marriage in the District of 
Columbia but were unable to legally return to Virginia to estab-
lish their marital abode.1GB However, the real implication of Lov-
153. In the aftermath of Baehr u. Lewin, many newspaper articles, columns, and 
letters to the editor appeared nationwide discussing the issue of same-sex marriage. A 
clipping of headlines paints a, picture of confusion and dilemma: Gay Marriage, Ruling 
in Hawaii Seed for Legal Chaos in Nation, Would Challenge States' Honoring of Each 
Others' Laws, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 17, 1993, at A10; Hawaii's Solution, Ohio's Di-
lemma? Court Rulings Unclear on Same-Sex Nuptials, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 
18, 1993, at 5B; Sunstroke on Hawaii's Supreme Court?, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1993, at SO. 
154. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY. CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.5 (2d ed. 1992). 
155. [d.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 283(2) (1988): "A marriage 
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will eve-
rywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state 
which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time 
of the marriage." 
156. Amongst these will probably be states where courts have previously issued de-
cisions on the legality of same-sex marriages. See cases discussed supra notes 44-69 and 
accompanying text. 
157. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding anti-miscegenation statutes based 
on racial classifications violative of the United States Constitution) (see discussion supra 
notes 70-77 and accompanying text). 
158. [d. at 2. 
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ing was not simply the right to enter into a marriage, but the 
right also to live anywhere the plaintiffs chose. Baehr v. Lewin 
has similar implications. 
With the relatively recent decision of Bowers v. Hardwickl&9 
acting as a black cloud over gay civil rights, it is difficult to im-
agine the Supreme Court extending the fundamental right to 
marry to same-sex couples as they did to interracial couples in 
Loving.1eo However, while difficult to imagine, it is not impossi-
ble.1e1 Significantly, not until 1967 were interracial couples given 
the right to marry.1e2 As Loving amply illustrates, moral certain-
ties do change with time. lea 
159. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
160. In Hardwick, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision upheld Georgia's sex-neutral 
sodomy statute, indicating that the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable is an adequately rational basis to sup-
port the law. Id. at 196. The Court refused to find a "fundamental right" to engage in 
homosexual sodomy, even in the privacy of one's own home, noting that proscriptions 
against sodomy have ancient roots. Id. at 192. Justice White, in his majority opinion, 
characterized as "facetious" the·notion that homosexual sodomy is "deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 194. 
161. Justice White, the author of Hardwick is no longer on the Court. 
162. See Loving, 388 U.S. 1. 
163. James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Misce-
genation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 93 (1993). Mr. Trosino notes that in a 1991 poll of 
1500 Americans of all races, one of every five caucasians believed that interracial mar-
riage should be illegal. In 1972, two in five caucasians had held similar beliefs. Id. at 93 
n.3. 
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